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Race Cartels: How Constructor 
Collaboration Is Curbing Innovation 
in Formula 1 
ABSTRACT 
Formula 1 is in the midst of a copycat scandal: technology has 
made it possible for teams to reverse engineer clones of competitors’ race 
cars. This is a less than ideal state of affairs for the championship series, 
which prides itself on being the pinnacle of motorsport and automotive 
innovation, thanks in large part to the cars’ rapid rate of technological 
advancement. In order to address this problem, the Fédération 
Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA), Formula 1’s governing body, must 
increase independent innovation efforts by amending the technical 
regulations to restrict the extent of presently allowed inter-team 
collaboration. Worried that the sport was becoming a “copying 
championship,” the FIA adopted new measures that ban extreme reverse 
engineering methods. Because these new FIA regulations do not limit the 
degree of coordinated conduct between teams, this approach will likely 
fail to remedy the sport’s copying problem because team plagiarism is an 
anticompetitive side effect of this collusive behavior. 
The FIA addresses the copying problem as one of trade secret 
misappropriation. By contrast, this Note approaches the issue as one  
of unregulated anticompetitive conduct. Analyzing the technical 
partnerships in Formula 1 under antitrust law elucidates their harmful 
effects on the racing series. This Note urges the FIA to adopt measures 
that limit Formula 1 teams’ ability to collaborate, before the “A-B team” 
phenomenon further diminishes the sport’s innovation efforts. 
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Over the last few decades, and increasingly so in the last year, 
Formula 1 (F1) has been plagued by “copycat” scandals.1 Specifically, 
teams will photograph or otherwise document rival cars in order to 
reverse engineer parts of that car.2 This practice has triggered a slew of 
protests from teams, causing the Fédération Internationale de 
l’Automobile (FIA), F1’s governing body, to impose financial penalties 
and deductions in championship points and adopt new, stricter 
regulations.3 
F1’s copycat problem can be traced back to the sport’s failure to 
adequately encourage independent innovation. Part of the problem 
stems from the inadequate intellectual property (IP) protection afforded 
to the racing teams’ innovations. One might assume that F1 would be 
chock-full of patents: it has immense financial resources4 and some of 
 
 1. Jeremy Hart, Where’s Bond When You Need Him? How Teams Spy on Each Other in 
Formula One, AUTOWEEK (Dec. 1, 2002), https://www.autoweek.com/news/a2116451/wheres-bond-
when-you-need-him-how-teams-spy-each-other-formula-one/ [https://perma.cc/38D3-AXAR]; Jack 
de Menezes, F1 Engulfed in Copying Scandal as Five Teams Intend to Appeal Racing Point  
Decision, THE INDEPENDENT (Aug. 8, 2020, 11:14 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/mo-
tor-racing/formula1/f1-racing-point-copying-scandal-appeal-mercedes-ferrari-renault-70th-anni-
versary-grand-prix-a9660936.html [https://perma.cc/6AC2-U7E2]. 
 2. See Hart, supra note 1; Adam Cooper, F1 to Clamp Down on “Reverse Engineering” of 
Rival Cars, AUTOSPORT (Aug. 14, 2020, 7:58 AM), https://www.autosport.com/f1/news/151371/f1-
to-clamp-down-on-reverse-engineering-of-rival-cars [https://perma.cc/PJ8A-4XMR]. 
 3. See Cooper, supra note 2. 
 4. Dhruv George, What Are the Budgets for All 10 Formula One Teams in 2019?, 
ESSENTIALLY SPORTS (Nov. 1, 2019, 5:02 PM), https://www.essentiallysports.com/what-are-the-
budgets-for-all-10-formula-one-teams-2019/ [https://perma.cc/RD3F-ZZVF]; Asher Fair, Formula 
1: What Are Current Team Budgets with $175M Cap Impending?, BEYOND THE FLAG,  
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the best engineers in the world at its disposal.5 But in fact, few of the 
technological creations engineered in F1 factories are patented.6 This is 
due to the global nature of the racing season, in conjunction with the 
sport’s rapid rate of innovation.7 F1 is a “traveling circus,”8 with 
approximately twenty-one races per season, each in a different 
country.9 As a result, teams would have to obtain patents in each of 
these countries in order to effectively protect their inventions,10 or, 
alternatively, obtain internationally enforceable patents, which impose 
prepublication waiting periods ranging from eighteen months to five 
years.11 In that time, an entire racing season will have come and gone, 
and as a result, the patented technology would likely be obsolete on the 
racetrack.12 F1 is the pinnacle of motor racing, but it is also the pinnacle 
of technology: races are won by fractions of a second, so teams work 
around the clock in search of even the most minute lap-time advantage. 
Because of this, race technology has a limited lifetime.13 Accordingly, 
the incentive to patent race technology is marginal: a patent-holder’s 
right to exclusive use is of little value if no competitors are interested 
in exploiting the product.  
 
https://beyondtheflag.com/2019/11/06/formula-1-current-team-budgets-175m-cap-impending/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y8BN-5U8N] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021). 
 5. Vlad Savov, In Formula 1, You Have to Be Amazing Just to Be Average, THE VERGE 
(June 26, 2018, 8:37 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/26/17499438/formula1-french-grand-
prix-behind-the-scenes [https://perma.cc/29VY-GE44]. 
 6. See Gavin Dundas, Patents: A Driving Force in Formula 1?, REDDIE & GROSE  
(Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.reddie.co.uk/2015/03/25/patents-a-driving-force-in-formula-one/ 
[https://perma.cc/K3E7-UH5L]; Mike Evans, An Engineer’s Primer for Formula 1, MEDIUM  
(Mar. 18, 2018), https://medium.com/@mikeev/an-engineers-primer-for-formula-1-66a515a00a6f 
[https://perma.cc/ECS8-SZJT] (describing F1 as “[a] sport made up of corporations, all competing 
to create the best version of a product within a carefully-defined set of regulations, all while  
operating without the aid of patent protection”). 
 7. See Savov, supra note 5. 
 8. Brad Spurgeon, But Drivers Remain Secluded from Fans: It’s a Traveling Circus on 
Formula One Tour, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/26/sports/IHT-
but-drivers-remain-secluded-from-fans-its-a-traveling-circus-on.html [https://perma.cc/46VB-
4MT3]. 
 9. FORMULA 1, https://corp.formula1.com/ [https://perma.cc/26KS-QQ7S]. 
 10. See Jack Rogan, Formula 1: A Driving Force Behind Intellectual Property?, VENNER 
SHIPLEY (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.vennershipley.co.uk/resources/publications/2019/04/01/for-
mula-one-a-driving-force-behind-intellectual-property [https://perma.cc/3PG6-36FK]. 
 11. See Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 21, ¶ 2, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 
U.N.T.S. 231; FAQ - Applying for a Patent, EUR. PAT. OFF., https://www.epo.org/service-sup-
port/faq/own-file.html [https://perma.cc/7EZ5-BNRV] (last visited Nov. 12, 2020). 
 12. Telephone Interview with James Key, Technical Director, McLaren Racing (Jan. 4, 
2020); Rogan, supra note 10. 
 13. Telephone Interview with James Key, supra note 12. 
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Since patent protection is essentially unavailable to the racing 
teams, they generally rely on trade secret law.14 Trade secret law offers 
a different form of IP protection than that afforded by patents. 
Significantly, it is not unlawful to reverse engineer trade secrets in 
order to duplicate the protected invention.15 This means that, rather 
than investing in research and development of new technologies, many 
F1 teams spend time and resources attempting to clone components of 
their competitors’ cars.  
IP law is primarily concerned with encouraging creation. This is 
achieved by incentivizing inventors with economic benefits—the  
right to “reap what they sow.”16 The trade secrets of F1 are  
particularly vulnerable to disclosure though, and as a result, team  
IP is thinly protected or entirely unprotected by the law.  
Consequently, incentivizing F1 innovation depends upon the FIA, but 
current regulations fail to meet this responsibility. Significantly,  
the ramifications of these shortcomings extend far beyond the  
racetrack: many technologies that are incorporated into today’s road 
cars find their roots in F1 labs.17 These inventions improve automotive 
safety and efficiency both on and off the track, and as such, have 
repercussive effects in the global market.18 
This Note addresses the need for a regulatory regime in F1 that 
better incentivizes innovation and competition. Part I provides relevant 
background on the sport and the FIA. Part II examines how trade secret 
protection in F1 fails to further the goals of IP law. Part III proposes 
that the FIA modify F1 regulations by restricting the extent to which 
competitors are able to collaborate with each other. 
 
 14. See Rogan, supra note 10; Dundas, supra note 6. 
 15. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985) [hereinafter UTSA]; 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 39, Apr. 15, 1994,  
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 16. See TRIPS, supra note 15, at art. 7 (“The protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology”). 
 17. See Fraser Masefield, What Has F1 Ever Done for Us?, BLEACHER REP. (Oct. 19, 2013), 
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1816116 [https://perma.cc/QL8D-LN2Y]; Rogan, supra note 10. 
 18. See F1 Hybrid Engines Will Play ‘Major Part’ in Reducing Vehicle Emissions, Says 
Carey, FORMULA 1 (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.formula1.com/en/latest/article.f1-hybrid-engines-
will-play-major-part-in-reducing-vehicle-emissions-says.2bJbQ072G8dIfMsK8CANtk.html. 
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I. GETTING UP TO SPEED ON F1 
A. The World’s Best-Funded Science Fair 
In order to recognize why trade secret protection is so ill-suited 
to the world of F1, some background knowledge of the sport is required. 
As mentioned, an F1 season is generally comprised of twenty-one races 
(Grands Prix) in twenty-one different countries, all in pursuit of the 
World Constructor’s Championship title (WCC) and the World Driver’s 
Championship title (WDC).19 There are ten constructors20 and each 
team races two cars per Grand Prix, making a total of twenty F1 drivers 
on the grid. The WCC is awarded to the most successful “constructor,” 
a term used synonymously with “team” to describe the entity that 
designs and builds the race cars.21 The WDC, in contrast, is awarded to 
the most successful driver of the season, irrespective of the car.22 The 
championships are determined over the course of the season by an 
aggregate points system that is based on individual Grand Prix 
results.23 Both of these titles are awarded by the FIA.24 The FIA is an 
international association that promotes motor sport, as well as 
automotive safety, sustainability, and accessibility.25 For the purposes 
of this Note, it is sufficient to know that the FIA operates as F1’s 
governing body, complete with its own dispute resolution system.26 
The fact that the FIA awards two separate championship titles 
underscores what sets F1 apart from other sports. Success hinges as 
much, if not more, on technical (car) performance than on athletic 
(driver) performance.27 In this sense, F1 can be viewed as an unfair 
competition from the driver’s perspective because it is effectively “a 
 
 19. 2021 Formula One Sporting Regulations, FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE 
L’AUTOMOBILE, at arts. 6.1–6.2 (Feb. 19, 2021) [hereinafter 2021 F1 Sporting Regulations], 
https://www.fia.com/sites/default/files/2021_formula_1_sporting_regulations_-_iss_6_-_2021-02-
19.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG9B-DGSN]. 
 20. In the 2020 season, the ten teams were Mercedes, Ferrari, Red Bull, McLaren,  
Renault, Haas, Racing Point, Alfa Romeo, AlphaTauri, and Williams. 2020 F1 Drivers and Teams, 
RACEFANS, https://www.racefans.net/2020-f1-season/2020-f1-drivers-and-teams/ [https://perma.cc 
/SLH6-JLXZ] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021). 
 21. See 2021 F1 Sporting Regulations, supra note 19, at arts. 6.2–6.3. 
 22. Id. at art. 6.1. 
 23. Id. at arts. 6.1, 6.4. 
 24. Id. at arts. 6.1–6.2. 
 25. Organisation, FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE L’AUTOMOBILE, 
https://www.fia.com/organisation [https://perma.cc/KZ99-DDV5] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021). 
 26. FIA Courts, FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE L’AUTOMOBILE, https://www.fia.com/fia-
courts [https://perma.cc/9C36-9V7U] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021). 
 27. See Savov, supra note 5. 
860 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.  [Vol. 23:4:855 
science fair dressed up as a racing series.”28 Cyril Abiteboul, Renault’s 
managing director, put it succinctly: “You take the best driver in the 
world and you give him a lesser car . . . and he won’t win.”29  
It is probably not shocking to learn that F1 is a sport flooded 
with money. The ten teams collectively spent $2.6 billion in the 2018 
season.30 And unsurprisingly, deeper pockets often correlate with 
greater track success.31 In the last ten seasons, the only constructors to 
win the WCC have been Mercedes and Red Bull, with budgets of $484 
million and $445 million, respectively.32 Compare this with the $132 
million budget of Williams, whose last constructor title came in 1997.33  
Yet even with budgets in the hundreds of millions, it is not 
uncommon for F1 teams to operate at a loss.34 Constructors must 
redesign and rebuild their cars each season,35 and often any team 
revenues get pumped straight back into research and development 
(R&D).36 Moreover, with ever-increasing reliance on technological 
innovations, the continuous investment into R&D is necessary now 
more than ever in order to remain competitive in the sport.37  
It is not gratuitous to analogize an F1 car to a rocket. Hiding 
behind the chassis, these cars have almost a mile’s worth of wiring and 
roughly three hundred sensors, which transmit hundreds of gigabytes 
of data back to the engineers at up to one thousand times per second.38 
F1 cars can accelerate from 0 to 190 miles per hour in ten seconds, and 
 
 28. Evans, supra note 6. 
 29. Savov, supra note 5. 
 30. Christian Sylt, Revealed: The $2.6 Billion Budget That Fuels F1’s 10 Teams, FORBES 
(Apr. 8, 2018, 4:47 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/csylt/2018/04/08/revealed-the-2-6-billion-
budget-that-fuels-f1s-ten-teams/#4d839d5f6595 [https://perma.cc/3LUZ-YUZQ]. 
 31. See Fair, supra note 4.  
 32. See George, supra note 4. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Sebastian Anthony, Formula 1: A Technical Deep Dive into Building the World’s 
Fastest Cars, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 4, 2017, 7:26 AM), https://arstechnica.com/cars/2017/04/for-
mula-1-technology/ [https://perma.cc/8DWJ-X8FF]. 
 36. See Sylt, supra note 30. 
 37. See Matt Youson, The Insider’s Guide to . . . F1 Car Development, FORMULA 1 (Feb. 10, 
2020), https://www.formula1.com/en/latest/article.pursuit-of-performance-the-formula-1-develop-
ment-race.3KtlXW0NC45PnsrYEAzRPE.html.  
 38. See How Many Sensors Does Formula 1 Have?, AUTO. TECH. (June 29, 2017), 
http://blog.automotive-technology.com/how-many-sensors-does-formula-1-have/ [https://perma.cc/ 
G3JY-FCAK]; Christian Sylt, How Mercedes Uses Formula One to Rev Up Its Road Cars, FORBES 
(June 18, 2015, 3:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/csylt/2015/06/18/how-mercedes-uses-for-
mula-one-to-rev-up-its-road-cars/?sh=739fb0aa7b65 [https://perma.cc/332R-NVLK].  
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when braking around corners, drivers experience g-force magnitudes up 
to three times that of astronauts during a rocket launch.39  
It is thus apparent why F1 technical teams are comprised of the 
world’s top engineering specialists from a wide array of disciplines, 
including aerospace, mechanical, electrical, software, and chemical.40 
Fortunately, constructors are not the sole beneficiaries of F1 
innovations. Many race technologies have been incorporated into 
today’s road cars,41 while other constructor inventions are utilized by 
public service sectors, such as health care, manufacturing, and 
transport.42 Take, for example, traction control, which first appeared on 
the racetrack in 1990.43 This is an electronic stability response that 
automatically intervenes to prevent a car from losing control on  
slippery roads when a wheel loses grip.44 Today, traction control is a 
safety measure widely available in road cars and has particular 
lifesaving import in wet driving conditions.45 Continuously variable 
transmissions, active suspension, carbon fiber chassis, and kinetic 
energy recovery system (KERS) are further examples of F1’s “trickle 
down” effect.46 Today, KERS powers hybrid cars, public bus systems, 
and even remote islands that are unconnected to mainland power 
 
 39. G-force is used to measure the force of Earth’s gravitational pull on an object. See John 
Papiewski, What Does G Force Mean?, SCIENCING, https://sciencing.com/what-does-g-force-mean-
13710432.html [https://perma.cc/CW6N-EZ8D] (Mar. 29, 2018); Oprah Sagal, Is Driving an F1 Car 
Even More Physically Challenging than a Rocket Launch into Space?, MOTORLAT (Dec. 26, 2017), 
https://www.motorlat.com/notas/3461-is-driving-an-f1-car-even-more-physically-challenging-
than-a-rocket-launch-into-space- [https://perma.cc/YG7E-WVPJ]; Anthony, supra note 35. 
 40. See Jordan Golson, Formula 1 Racing Teams Have Intense Recruitment Programs for 
Engineers, POPULAR SCI. (May 16, 2019), https://www.popsci.com/formula-1-infiniti-engineering-
program/ [https://perma.cc/9LZV-LXW4]; Savov, supra note 5; Evans, supra note 6. 
 41. Masefield, supra note 17; see Sylt, supra note 38. 
 42. See Pioneering a Better Future, MCLAREN APPLIED, https://www.mclaren.com/ap-
plied/about/ [https://perma.cc/F93E-BYQL] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021); Applied Science, 
MERCEDES AMG PETRONAS FORMULA ONE TEAM, https://www.mercedesamgf1.com/en/applied-sci-
ence [https://perma.cc/ZN4R-SGHS] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021). 
 43. See Abhishek Bharadwaj, Watch: Detailed Video Shows How Traction Control Ban 
Has Changed an F1 Driver’s Approach, ESSENTIALLY SPORTS (Apr. 11, 2020, 4:54 PM), 
https://www.essentiallysports.com/f1-news-watch-detailed-video-shows-how-traction-control-ban-
has-changed-an-f1-drivers-approach/ [https://perma.cc/7TXH-2GQQ]. 
 44. See Tom Barnard, What Is Traction Control?, CARBUYER (June 10, 2019), 
https://www.carbuyer.co.uk/tips-and-advice/168758/what-is-traction-control [https://perma.cc/ 
RF7Z-URM5]. 
 45. See Masefield, supra note 17. 
 46. See id.; How F1’s Best Brains Have Made Hybrid Tech the Future of Road Cars, 
EUROSPORT, https://www.eurosport.com/formula-1/how-f1-s-best-brains-have-made-hybrid-tech-
the-future-of-road-cars_sto5003914/story.shtml [https://perma.cc/7KK5-WMAU] (Nov. 26, 2015, 
5:27 AM). 
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grids.47 The FIA’s recent commitment to green racing will likely result 
in an upsurge of applied race technologies.48 F1 power units are already 
the world’s most efficient engines,49 but hybrid capabilities are being 
dramatically ramped up as FIA regulation changes force the sport into 
eco-friendly terrain.50  
Yet, this drive to constantly create cutting-edge technologies has 
been asterisked by F1’s ever-growing “B-team” phenomenon.51 Weary of 
the insurmountable costs that go into running an F1 team, FIA 
regulations allow for constructors to license a number of car parts to 
rivals.52 This supply system has effects both on and off the track. 
B. Hitting the Brakes on Innovation 
Each year, the FIA promulgates regulations for the upcoming F1 
season.53 Included in these regulations are rules setting forth which 
parts of the race car can be bought from rival teams and which parts 
must be the constructors’ own IP.54 Car parts that can be supplied to 
competitors are called “transferable components.”55 The gearbox, 
engine mount, and suspension are all transferable components.56 For 
the purposes of this Note, F1 engines (also called power units) will be 
 
 47. Samarth Kanal, How F1 Technology Has Supercharged the World, FORMULA 1 (Nov. 
7, 2019), https://www.formula1.com/en/latest/article.how-f1-technology-has-supercharged-the-
world.6Gtk3hBxGyUGbNH0q8vDQK.html. 
 48. See Dieter Rencken & Keith Collantine, F1 Mustn’t Miss Opportunity Offered by 2026 
Engine Rules Change – Brawn, RACEFANS (June 17, 2020, 7:20 AM), https://www.race-
fans.net/2020/06/17/f1-mustnt-miss-opportunity-offered-by-2026-engine-rules-change-brawn/ 
[https://perma.cc/K6VR-APGX]. 
 49. Kanal, supra note 47. 
 50. These include switching from petrol to biofuels (2022), an increase to 50 percent  
electric engines (2026), and a pledge to become carbon neutral (2030). See Dominic Tobin,  
Two-Stroke Engines and Eco-Fuel: F1 Aims to Be Greener than Formula E, MOTOR  
SPORT MAG., https://www.motorsportmagazine.com/articles/single-seaters/f1/two-stroke-engines-
eco-fuel-f1-aims-to-be-greener-than-formula-e [https://perma.cc/PP7H-5ZSG] (Jan. 13, 2020);  
Rencken & Collantine, supra note 48. 
 51. See Scott Mitchell, Renault: B-Teams a Danger to F1’s 2021 Vision, MOTORSPORT.COM 
(Mar. 15, 2019, 7:32 AM), https://www.motorsport.com/f1/news/renault-fears-over-b-team-dan-
gers/4352909/ [https://perma.cc/GFF6-HYGS]. 
 52. See 2021 Formula One Technical Regulations, FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE 
L’AUTOMOBILE, at art. 22.5.1 (Mar. 5, 2021) [hereinafter 2021 F1 Technical Regulations], 
https://www.fia.com/sites/default/files/2021_formula_1_technical_regulations_-_iss_9_-_2021-03-
05.pdf [https://perma.cc/N423-XF75]. 
 53. Kate Walker, The Task of Keeping F1 Racing Honest, and Safe, N.Y. TIMES  
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/sports/autoracing/f1-racing-safety.html 
[https://perma.cc/3WHM-WKYF]. 
 54. 2021 F1 Technical Regulations, supra note 52, at arts. 22.3, 22.5. 
 55. Id. at art. 22.5.1. 
 56. Id. at app. 4. 
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referred to as transferable components because they are supplied to 
competing constructors in a similar manner, but FIA regulations do not 
denote them as such.57 Only four constructors manufacture power units 
because the part is so complex and expensive to produce.58 Those 
teams—Mercedes, Ferrari, Renault, and Red Bull—are known as 
“works” or “factory teams,” 59 and they supply engines to the remaining 
six constructors, who are known as “customer teams.”60 Works teams 
design and manufacture every aspect of their cars, while customers 
construct their cars around the purchased components.61 This is 
because FIA regulations mandate that transferable components 
supplied to customers be identical to those components used by the 
works team in either the current F1 season or the previous one;62 
customers can have no input in, nor knowledge of, the design process.63  
Works teams choose which competitors they supply parts to.64 
The ability to strategically license transferable components creates 
technical partnerships on the grid, but these partnerships vary in 
degree. This is because there are two distinct types of customer  
 
 57. Id. at art. 22.2.1(d); see Tanish Chachra, F1 Engine Suppliers 2020: Who Supplies  
Engines to Formula 1 Teams?, THE SPORTS RUSH (Aug. 16, 2020), https://thesportsrush.com/f1-
news-f1-engine-suppliers-2020-who-supplies-engines-to-formula-1-teams/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5K9E-9CNS]. 
 58. See Chachra, supra note 57. 
 59. At the moment, Red Bull is not technically an F1 engine manufacturer because its 
power units are made by Honda, a third party. Id. Honda has manufactured Red Bull’s engines 
since 2019 but will cease to do so at the end of the 2021 season. Red Bull Secures Engine  
Technology Ahead of Honda’s Departure, ESPN (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.espn.com/f1/story/_/ 
id/30904403/red-bull-secures-engine-technology-ahead-honda-departure [https://perma.cc/D6YZ-
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“factory” team. 
 60. See Chachra, supra note 57; Jonathan Noble, Renault Wants “Partners”, Not  
Customer Teams in F1, MOTORSPORT.COM (Sept. 9, 2020, 3:50 AM), https://us.motorsport.com/f1/ 
news/renault-partners-engine-customer-teams/4871056/ [https://perma.cc/H4FN-556Y]. 
 61. See Scott Mitchell, Where Aston Fits in the Great F1 ‘Works Team’ Debate, THE RACE 
(Feb. 7, 2020), https://the-race.com/formula-1/where-aston-fits-in-the-great-f1-works-team-debate/ 
[https://perma.cc/SRE3-NVMK]. 
 62. 2021 F1 Technical Regulations, supra note 52, at art. 22.5.4. Here, regulations differ 
between transferable components and power units, in that power units supplied to customer teams 
must be identical to those used by the factory team in the current season. In other words, engine 
suppliers cannot sell their customers last season’s engine model. See 2021 F1 Sporting  
Regulations, supra note 19, at app. 4(9). 
 63. See 2021 F1 Technical Regulations, supra note 52, at arts. 22.5.3–22.5.4. 
 64. See Mercedes Rules Out Supplying Engines to Red Bull, ESPN (Oct. 9, 2020), 
https://www.espn.com/f1/story/_/id/30077269/mercedes-rules-supplying-engines-red-bull 
[https://perma.cc/P8CP-RAFW]. 
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teams: the traditional customer and the B-team.65 B-teams, which are 
becoming more prevalent, buy a host of transferable components from 
their engine supplier and often share facilities or personnel.66 For 
example, Ferrari supplies Haas with every transferable part and grants 
Haas access to the Ferrari wind tunnel for aerodynamic testing.67 
Ferrari employees are also occasionally reassigned to the Haas division, 
which operates in a neighboring building.68 Despite this level of 
cooperation, both Ferrari and Haas insist that they remain independent 
constructors.69 AlphaTauri and Red Bull take a more extreme approach 
to the A-B team alliance: both F1 teams are owned by the energy drink 
company, but in addition to obtaining the “hand-me-down” components 
of last season’s Red Bull car, AlphaTauri operates as its junior or “sister 
team.”70 Newly promoted F1 drivers will start with the B-team before 
graduating to a seat in the Red Bull car.71 A-B team alliances are of 
great financial benefit to both the works and customer teams, but they 
also provide strategic advantages.72 With a newly imposed spending cap 
on the horizon,73 increased collaboration presents an opportunity for  
 
 65. See Mitchell, supra note 51. 
 66. See Jonathan Noble, Is F1 Heading Towards a ‘Slave Team’ Future?, 
MOTORSPORT.COM (Aug. 30, 2018, 8:29 AM), https://www.motorsport.com/f1/news/is-f1-heading-
towards-a-slave-team-future/3167350/?nrt=54. 
 67. See Daan de Geus, What You Need to Know About the Haas F1 ‘Ferrari Replica’ Row, 
THE DRIVE (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.thedrive.com/accelerator/19799/what-you-need-to-know-
about-the-haas-f1-ferrari-replica-row [https://perma.cc/N7L5-5MZB]. 
 68. Dieter Rencken & Keith Collantine, More Ferrari Staff to Join Separate Haas Division 
Working on 2022 Car, RACEFANS (Dec. 22, 2020, 12:27 PM), https://www.racefans.net/2020/ 
12/22/more-ferrari-staff-to-join-separate-haas-division-working-on-2022-car/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4UM6-BYHB]. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Gary Anderson, Gary Anderson on AlphaTauri: Not Just a Red Bull Clone, THE 
RACE (Feb. 15, 2020), https://the-race.com/formula-1/gary-anderson-on-alphatauri-not-just-a-red-
bull-clone/ [https://perma.cc/647M-GC4F]; Lawrence Barretto, Analysis: What Does AlphaTauri’s 
Switch from Red Bull’s ‘Junior’ to ‘Sister’ Team Actually Mean?, FORMULA 1 (Sept.  
17, 2020), https://www.formula1.com/en/latest/article.analysis-what-does-alphatauris-switch- 
from-red-bulls-junior-to-sister-team.3Q2JmXhmJirgZc7AGRsF9e.html; Mark Hughes, Mark  
Hughes: Expect AlphaTauri Shocks, but Not in Its Design, THE RACE (Feb. 28, 2021),  
https://the-race.com/formula-1/mark-hughes-expect-alphatauri-shocks-but-not-in-its-design/ 
[https://perma.cc/6YZW-WFSQ]. 
 71. See e.g., ALEX ALBON, https://alexalbon.com [https://perma.cc/74QB-8368] (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2021); Pierre Gasly, FORMULA 1, https://www.formula1.com/en/drivers/pierre-gasly.html 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2021); Yuki Tsunoda, FORMULA 1, https://www.formula1.com/en/drivers/yuki-
tsunoda.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2021); Max Verstappen, FORMULA 1, https://www.for-
mula1.com/en/drivers/max-verstappen.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). 
 72. See Noble, supra note 66. 
 73. This season the FIA will impose restrictions on team spending for the first time. 
The hope is that spending caps will aid competition and make the sport more sustainable. The 
2021 limit is $145 million, which drops to $140 million in 2022, and $135 million in 2023. See 
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A-teams currently operating above the cap to reassign engineers to 
customer B-teams, where that employee can continue to carry out the 
same tasks on the same transferable parts.74 This allows A-teams to 
obtain up to three times the amount of testing data that independent 
teams can and lets A-teams work around the cost-cutting requirements 
of the upcoming spending cap.75 
These technical partnership arrangements are in stark contrast 
to the more traditional customer-factory team relationship.76 Take 
McLaren, for instance. McLaren does not manufacture its own power 
unit, thereby making it the customer of a works team.77 But McLaren 
does not purchase any additional transferable components from its 
engine supplier, insisting instead on designing and manufacturing 
every other aspect of the car itself.78 Williams was, until recently, the 
only other independent customer team.79 Shortly after the Williams 
family was driven to sell its once-triumphant team as a result of not 
being able to keep up with the spending of rival constructors, the new 
owners announced a decision to strengthen ties between Williams and 
its engine supplier Mercedes.80 Williams will now purchase additional 
transferable components from Mercedes, making it Mercedes’s second 
B-team.81 
C. You Can Race, But You Can’t Hide 
“Listed” components are distinct from transferable components. 
Listed parts must be the constructor’s own IP, meaning they have to be 
 
Lawrence Barretto, The 2021 F1 Cost Cap Explained – What Has Changed and Why?, FORMULA 1 
(May 27, 2020), https://www.formula1.com/en/latest/article.the-2021-f1-cost-cap-explained-what-
has-changed-and-why.5O1Te8udKLmkUl4PyVZtUJ.html.  
 74. See Noble, supra note 66. 
 75. See id.; Mitchell, supra note 51. 
 76. See Scott Mitchell, McLaren/Williams in F1 “Void” Between Works Teams and  
B-Teams, MOTORSPORT.COM (Jan. 12, 2019, 3:46 AM), https://www.motorsport.com/f1/news/ 
mclaren-williams-team-model-void/4322309/ [https://perma.cc/BYK9-26S9]. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Luke Smith, 2021 McLaren F1 Car “Essentially New” Due to Mercedes Engine 
Switch, AUTOSPORT (Jan. 27, 2021, 3:56 AM), https://www.autosport.com/f1/news/154766/2021-
mclaren-essentially-new-due-to-mercedes-switch [https://perma.cc/9WCK-VYWV]. 
 79. Lawrence Barretto, Analysis: Why Williams Have Strengthened Ties with Mercedes, 
and What It Means for the Future, FORMULA 1 (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.formula1.com/en/lat-
est/article.analysis-why-williams-have-strengthened-ties-with-mercedes-and-what-it-
means.5zuTRRdJklUloOw6nqo1lr.html. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.; Elizabeth Blackstock, Williams F1 Expands Its Technical Collaboration with  
Mercedes, JALOPNIK (Jan. 10, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://jalopnik.com/williams-f1-expands-its-tech-
nical-collaboration-with-me-1846025965. 
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both designed and manufactured by each individual team.82 
Constructors are not allowed to share or receive any information on 
listed parts, such as designs or data.83   
Aerodynamic components are the quintessential listed parts.84 
The success of an F1 car depends more on aerodynamics than it does on 
engine power.85 Since the ten constructors rely on four power units 
among them,86 aerodynamic performance is what really differentiates 
the cars on the track.87 Aerodynamic components denote all parts of the 
race car that come into contact with the outside air—in other words, the 
car’s bodywork.88  
But because most technical innovations in F1 are not patented, 
the IP protection for bodywork is very thin. For this reason, the FIA 
explicitly prohibits the sharing of any listed component information.89 
However, reverse engineering listed parts from rival cars has, until 
now, been allowed under sporting regulations.90 And historically, F1 
teams have certainly taken advantage of the ability to copy.91 Ron 
Dennis, McLaren’s team principal until 2009, described the practice as 
such: “Spying is the wrong word, industrial espionage is probably a 
more appropriate expression.”92 Although spying methodologies can be 
quite devious—tape measure-wielding infiltrators have been found 
under cars on multiple occasions93—the most relied upon approach is 
 
 82. 2021 F1 Technical Regulations, supra note 52, at arts. 22.3.1–22.3.2. 
 83. Id. at art. 22.3.4. 
 84. See id. at art. 22.2.1.c. 
 85. Telephone Interview with James Key, Technical Director, McLaren Racing (Feb. 1, 
2020); Telephone Interview with James Key, supra note 12; see The Secret Aerodynamicist,  
Formula 1: The Secret Aerodynamicist Reveals Design Concepts, BBC SPORT (Mar. 15,  
2019), https://www.bbc.com/sport/formula1/47527705 [https://perma.cc/AFJ3-XWW4]; Elizabeth  
Blackstock, Formula One Wind Tunnels: Explained, JALOPNIK (Nov. 22, 2020, 12:00 PM), 
https://jalopnik.com/formula-one-wind-tunnels-explained-1845734903 [https://perma.cc/Q5T3-
MA2U]. 
 86. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
 87. Telephone Interview with James Key, supra note 12; The Secret Aerodynamicist,  
supra note 85. 
 88. 2021 F1 Technical Regulations, supra note 52, at arts. 1.4, 3; see also id. at app. 4. 
 89. See id. at art. 22.3.4. 
 90. See Gary Anderson, Gary Anderson: How Reverse-Engineering in F1 Really Works, 
THE RACE (Aug. 23, 2020), https://the-race.com/formula-1/gary-anderson-how-reverse-engineer-
ing-in-f1-really-works/ [https://perma.cc/7GHH-3ABM]. 
 91. See Dieter Rencken & Keith Collantine, Claims Racing Point Built a Mercedes Clone 
Show “You Have to Think Before You Talk” – Steiner, RACEFANS (Feb. 19, 2020, 8:31 PM), 
https://www.racefans.net/2020/02/19/claims-racing-point-built-a-mercedes-clone-show-you-have-
to-think-before-you-talk-steiner/ [https://perma.cc/CG8N-F36N]. 
 92. See Hart, supra note 1. 
 93. See id. 
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the use of photography.94 Constructors employ photographers whose 
entire job is to take detailed snapshots of rival cars.95 More recently, 
team photographers have used 3D cameras to scan the bodywork, 
making it easier for engineers to duplicate components of the car.96 The 
practice of photographing and copying cars is long-standing and 
commonplace in F1, but that does not mean that it is accepted with open 
arms.97 Drivers and engineers have gone to great lengths to prevent 
their IP from leaking out,98 even when up against FIA regulations that 
make hiding their creations from sleuths very difficult.99 While F1 
principals have differing viewpoints on the seriousness of the issue, 
there is agreement amongst constructors that the copycat car 
phenomenon is a product of FIA regulations.100  
D. A One-Mercedes Race 
Although copying cars is not a sanctioned F1 practice, it is a 
practice governed by unspoken rules. In the 2020 season, Racing Point 
broke those rules by “cloning” the 2019 Mercedes race car, the W10.101 
Racing Point is a Mercedes B-team because it gets its engine, 
hydraulics, and gearbox from the championship team and uses the 
 
 94. See id. 
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https://www.planetf1.com/news/mercedes-rivals-3d-cameras/ [https://perma.cc/R4UP-RG2L]. 
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Designs, AUTOSPORT (Aug. 7, 2020, 5:50 AM), https://www.autosport.com/f1/news/151145/f1-to-
outlaw-copycat-cars-from-next-year [https://perma.cc/7NUT-MNNQ] (quoting Nikolas Tombazis, 
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time. . . . People take photos and sometimes reverse engineer them and make similar concepts.”). 
 98. See Hart, supra note 1 (recounting when driver Michael Schumacher sat with his  
Ferrari for an hour at the 2002 British Grand Prix to ensure that “no one looked in the wrong way 
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 99. See Jonathan Noble, F1 Teams No Longer Allowed to Hide Cars in Testing, 
MOTORSPORT.COM (Dec. 5, 2019, 1:34 AM), https://www.motorsport.com/f1/news/garage-screen-
hide-cars-testing/4606965/ [https://perma.cc/U5ND-L5PX]. 
 100. See Rencken & Collantine, supra note 91 (explaining that Haas and AlphaTauri team 
principals attribute the copying to FIA regulations); Mike Pryson, Racing Point F1 Issue Is About 
So Much More than Brake Ducts, AUTOWEEK (Aug. 15, 2020), https://www.autoweek.com/rac-
ing/formula-1/a33612513/racing-point-f1-issue-is-about-so-much-more-that-brake-ducts/ 
[https://perma.cc/RG8Z-FERY] (describing how McLaren, Renault, and Ferrari team principals 
also blame FIA regulations for design copying). 
 101. See Luke Smith, Seidl: F1 Risks Becoming “Copying Championship” with Racing Point 
Model, AUTOSPORT (July 17, 2020, 4:49 AM), https://www.autosport.com/f1/news/150629/racing-
point-model-risks-a-copying-championship [https://perma.cc/Y3F6-3JVB]. 
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Mercedes wind tunnel for aerodynamic testing.102 In 2018 and 2019, 
Racing Point also obtained design data for its front brake ducts from 
Mercedes.103 Brake ducts had been transferable components prior to the 
2020 season, at which point the FIA designated them to be listed 
parts.104 This regulation change meant that every team was required to 
develop its brake ducts independently, without relying on the IP of 
works teams. But instead of starting from scratch, Racing Point 
manufactured both its front and rear brake ducts relying on its  
2019 model, which had been designed by Mercedes.105 Notably, FIA 
regulations did not address how or to what extent teams were to “design 
around” newly listed parts that had been purchased from works teams 
in previous seasons when brake ducts were transferable.106 Although 
operating within a gray area, Racing Point was sanctioned for breaking 
sporting regulations.107 This outcome can be attributed to the fact that, 
in addition to being a Mercedes customer and relying on Mercedes’s 
brake duct data, Racing Point further copied the design of the W10 to 
such a degree that it was quickly dubbed the “Pink Mercedes” by F1 
commentators (Racing Point’s team color is pink).108 Racing Point 
maintains that the extensive similarities between its car and the W10 
were the product of reverse engineering, but rival teams impugn this, 
insisting that critical aspects of the car, which go to its “concept,” cannot 
be correctly copied from photographs because they are not outwardly 
 
 102. Dieter Rencken & Keith Collantine, Racing Point to Use Mercedes Wind Tunnel, 
RACEFANS (Apr. 8, 2019, 12:59 PM), https://www.racefans.net/2019/04/08/racing-point-to-use-mer-
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 103. See Dominic Tobin, What Racing Point Did Wrong: Brake Duct Penalty Explained, 
MOTOR SPORT MAG., https://www.motorsportmagazine.com/articles/single-seaters/f1/what-racing-
point-did-wrong-brake-duct-penalty-explained [https://perma.cc/9B65-DWCS] (Dec. 3, 2020). 
 104. See Thomas Maher, Why Racing Point’s Legal Brake Ducts Break the Rules, FORMULA 
SPY (Aug. 7, 2020), https://formulaspy.com/f1/why-racing-points-legal-brake-ducts-break-the-
rules-70418 [https://perma.cc/GA42-ZYFD]. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. For further details on the Racing Point brake duct saga, see Tobin, supra note 
103. 
 108. See Jake Boxall-Legge, Why Racing Point’s ‘Copycat’ Shouldn’t Be Controversial, 
AUTOSPORT (Apr. 11, 2020, 10:03 AM), https://www.autosport.com/f1/feature/10038/why-racing-
point-copycat-shouldnt-be-controversial; Jake Boxall-Legge, How Racing Point Is Gambling on a 
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discernable.109 Prominent figures within F1 accused Mercedes and its 
B-team of collusion.110 
The “Pink Mercedes” controversy has forced F1 to reflect on the 
extent to which copying has infiltrated the sport. Amidst fears that  
the racing series would become a “copying championship,”111 the FIA 
approved amendments for the 2021 regulations that “prevent the 
extensive use of reverse engineering of rival designs for the design of a 
car’s aerodynamic surfaces.”112 The new regulations state that teams 
cannot design listed components by reverse engineering rival cars, but 
can still be inspired by the designs and creations of competitors.113 
Banned reverse engineering measures include 3D cameras, noncontact 
surface scanning, and any software that facilitates data extraction from 
photographic images.114 If the FIA decides that a listed component 
“closely resemble[s]” that of a competitor, teams will be asked to  
provide evidence that demonstrates the component was independently 
created.115 
II. TRADE SECRECY IN F1 
Trade secrets can be comprised of a wide variety of subject 
matter.116 There is no exact definition, but the typical requirements are 
that the IP must derive independent economic value by virtue of being 
generally unknown in the industry and not easily ascertainable.117 The 
holder of the trade secret must also expend reasonable efforts in 
 
 109. See Martin Brundle, Martin Brundle Column: Tyres and Tensions at 70th Anniversary 
GP, SKY SPORTS, https://www.skysports.com/f1/news/12433/12047020/martin-brundle-column-
tyres-and-tensions-at-70th-anniversary-gp [https://perma.cc/CW2C-RGBN] (Aug. 11, 2020, 8:30 
PM). 
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 111. See Smith, supra note 101 (discussing McLaren team principal Andreas Seidl’s  
concern that F1 risks becoming “a copying championship”); Noble, supra note 97 (capturing FIA 
executive Nikolas Tombazis’s position that “[w]e don’t want next year to have eight or ten  
Mercedes or copies of Mercedes”). 
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F1I.COM (Oct. 10, 2020, 9:47 AM), https://f1i.com/news/386497-fia-rubber-stamps-2021-rules-ban-
ning-reverse-engineering.html [https://perma.cc/4THP-2LFZ]. 
 113. See Dominic Tobin, How Racing Point Loophole Is Closed with 2021 F1 Regulations, 
MOTOR SPORT MAG. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.motorsportmagazine.com/articles/single-seaters/ 
f1/how-racing-point-loophole-is-closed-with-2021-f1-regulations [https://perma.cc/2LDR-HF86]. 
 114. 2021 F1 Technical Regulations, supra note 52, at art. 22.3.3. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See UTSA, supra note 15, § 1(4). 
 117. See id. § 1(4)(i). 
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maintaining its secrecy.118 But despite its broad scope, trade secret law 
bestows a very thin veil of protection. First of all, the same trade secret 
can theoretically be used simultaneously by multiple entities, as long 
as the information remains mostly unknown.119 Relatedly, if a 
competitor independently ascertains a trade secret, there is no cause  
of action against the discoverer.120 This means the trade secret  
holder cannot enjoin the independent discoverer from exploiting the 
information.121 And lastly, successful reverse engineering of trade 
secrets is perfectly legal.122 It is thus the burden of the trade secret 
holder to maintain the confidentiality of the IP if he or she wishes to 
keep it.123 A trade secret holder’s legal recourse is generally restricted 
to claims against someone who breached a contractual duty (e.g., a 
nondisclosure agreement), or who discovered the trade secret by 
“improper means” (e.g., theft).124  
The justification for the limited scope of trade secret  
liability rests in society’s interest in spurring competition through  
investment in innovation.125 Hence the legal exception for reverse  
engineering—those that expend effort in discovering the trade secret by 
their own merits are rewarded with the right to exploit it. By extension, 
once it is widely known, a trade secret ceases to exist.126 Conversely, 
trade secrets can theoretically exist in perpetuity if never revealed.127  
A. F1 Trade Secrets Are Particularly Susceptible to Misappropriation 
Best practices for maintaining the confidentiality of trade 
secrets are generally classified into three categories: physical security 
(storing information in a secure environment and restricting access to 
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 121. See id. §§ 1(2), 1 cmt. 1, 2(a). 
 122. See id. § 1 cmt. 2. 
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authorized personnel), legal security (nondisclosure, noncompetition, 
and nonuse agreements), and digital security (password protection and 
data encryption).128 While these practices are capable of protecting 
trade secrets to a certain extent in any normal business environment, 
their operational effectiveness in F1 is particularly limited. 
1. Physical Security 
Despite their reputation for covertness, F1 teams are uniquely 
vulnerable to trade secret exposure. In E.I. duPont deNemours & Co.  
v. Christopher, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, 
under Texas law, discerning a trade secret without investing the  
efforts and expenses necessary to independently discover it is 
presumptively an “improper means” of discovery unless the original 
holder failed to take reasonable precautions in maintaining the secret’s 
confidentiality.129 Here, the defendant utilized aerial photography to 
obtain pictures of duPont’s chemical plant that would have enabled 
someone to reverse engineer duPont’s secret methanol manufacturing 
process.130 In finding defendants liable for industrial espionage, the 
court drew a line between its “devotion to free wheeling industrial 
competition” and “accepting the law of the jungle as the standard  
of morality.”131 In reaching this conclusion, the court conducted a  
cost-benefit analysis.132 On the one hand, surveillance of competitors’ 
business practices generates market improvements and efficiencies. On 
the other hand, requiring an enterprise to scrupulously hide every 
aspect of its operation imposes onerous costs. Society would prefer those 
expenditures be devoted to research and development of intellectual 
products. Additionally, consumers would benefit more if the spying 
entity focused its efforts on independent innovation instead of on 
copying the preexisting procedures of competitors.  
Despite the parallels between duPont’s illicit aerial 
photographers and the industrial espionage of F1, the Fifth Circuit and 
the FIA have approached their respective problems with drastically 
different methodologies. F1 constructors go to extreme efforts to protect 
their technical developments from unwanted surveillance.133 Therefore, 
under the duPont reasoning, any acquisition of a team’s trade secrets 
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that did not arise from independent devotion of time and money is 
misappropriation. Yet until the Racing Point saga, the FIA had 
historically declined to crack down on this means of discovery, barring 
the most extreme cases that involved theft of confidential documents.134  
Despite the fact that this practice of industrial espionage is 
widely known within F1,135 the FIA has recently made it even more 
difficult for teams to protect their trade secrets by extending the ban on 
screens and coverings that “obscure any part of a car . . . in the paddock, 
garages, pit lane or grid” to include preseason testing.136 Previously, the 
rule only applied to Grand Prix weekends.137 This is significant because 
the paddock, grid, pit lane, and garage, all of which are off-track, are 
where the cars are most accessible to third parties, and therefore, 
vulnerable to exposure. This is in part due to the sport’s physical 
requirements, which necessitate that teams operate in close proximity 
to each other—the garages must all abut the pit lane, for instance. But 
it is also a consequence of the FIA regulations. For example, before and 
after each race, the cars are held on a “dummy grid” known as parc 
fermé (French for “closed park”).138 Parc fermé is a sectioned-off area of 
the paddock where FIA officials inspect the cars for regulation 
conformity.139 FIA scrutineers can order that the cars be dismantled in 
parc fermé in order to ensure technical compliance, either of their own 
volition or upon protest by rival teams.140 Only FIA officials can be 
within the post-race parc fermé,141 but team members and the media 
can stand along the fenced area to observe the inspections.142 Because 
 
 134. See Brad Spurgeon, McLaren Fined $100 Million in Formula One Spying  
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/13/sports/13iht-
prix.5.7500107.html [https://perma.cc/YF5J-A46K]. 
 135. See F1’s Dark Secret: Teams Hire Photographers for Season to Spy on Rivals’ Cars, 
BUS. STANDARD, https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/f1-s-dark-secret-teams-
hire-photographers-for-season-to-spy-on-rivals-cars-115031500257_1.html [https://perma.cc/ 
EE9M-26ML] (Mar. 15, 2015, 1:28 PM). 
 136. Noble, supra note 99. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See Balazs Szabo, F1 Explained: Parc Ferme, F1 TECH. (July 11, 2018, 6:01 PM), 
https://www.f1technical.net/news/21724 [https://perma.cc/7Q3A-7BWY]; 2021 F1 Sporting  
Regulations, supra note 19, at arts. 34, 44. 
 139. Szabo, supra note 138; F1 Drivers Explain F1: What Is Parc Ferme?, FORMULA 1 (June 
29, 2020), https://www.formula1.com/en/video/2020/6/F1_Drivers_Explain_F1__What_is_parc_ 
ferme__.html. 
 140. 2021 F1 Sporting Regulations, supra note 19, at arts. 14.3, 25.5(b); International 
Sporting Code, FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE L’AUTOMOBILE, at art. 13.4.3 (Jan.  
18, 2021), https://www.fia.com/sites/default/files/2021_international_sporting_code_fr-
en_clean._18.01.2021_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/97HM-MHGW]. 
 141. 2021 F1 Sporting Regulations, supra note 19, at art. 44.1. 
 142. Kym Illman, Photographing Formula 1 Parc Ferme, YOUTUBE (Oct. 6, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ujSsV6BO2aE. 
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drivers and constructors are unable to shield parts of the car from 
unwanted eyes during this time,143 this presents a golden opportunity 
for spying.144 
2. Legal Security 
It is not just the cars themselves that pose a threat to trade 
secrets. Human capital is also a major concern. Because the world of F1 
is so small, employee movement between teams is very common.145 This 
practice can be especially provocative when the employees being 
poached are FIA officials, who are privy to vast amounts of confidential 
constructor information.146 For this reason, teams can and do include 
restrictive covenants in their employment contracts. The use of “garden 
leave” is particularly ubiquitous.147 Garden leave originated in England 
in the late 1980s in response to English courts’ distaste for how the law 
of noncompetes treated breach of notice provisions in employment 
contracts.148 During garden leave as developed under English law, 
employees are relieved from all or some of their duties but remain  
at the firm as paid employees—thus still bound by the duty of  
 
 143. Phillip van Osten, Newey Reveals His Sneaky Trick for Spying on Ferrari, F1I.COM 
(July 11, 2017, 8:18 AM), https://f1i.com/news/284922-newey-reveals-sneaky-trick-piercing-ferra-
ris-secrets.html [https://perma.cc/7ZUF-Z62N]. 
 144. Id. (quoting Red Bull’s Chief Technical Officer stating, “If I really want to look at a 
car, I need only wait until . . . parc fermé, where nobody’s allowed to touch them for an hour. 
They’re often parked right under your nose, and with all the mechanics busy packing up, you can 
look at them as much as you like.”). 
 145. See, e.g., James Allison, MERCEDES-AMG PETRONAS FORMULA ONE TEAM, 
https://www.mercedesamgf1.com/en/team/management/james-allison/ [https://perma.cc/BZR9-
E9GB] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021) (tracing Allison’s career trajectory, which started in 1991 as an 
engineer at Benetton, then Larrousse, then back to Benetton, then to Ferrari, then back to  
Benetton again (at this point called Renault), then back again to Ferrari, and now finally at  
Mercedes). 
 146. See Nate Saunders, McLaren ‘Very Unhappy’ at Ferrari’s Signing of FIA Chief Laurent 
Mekies, ESPN, https://www.espn.in/espn/story/_/id/22789357/mclaren-very-unhappy-ferrari-sign-
ing-fia-chief-laurent-mekies?device=featurephone [https://perma.cc/U7NC-2TH8] (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2021). 
 147. See Elliot Wood, Gardening Leave: The Revolving Door F1 Should Be Worrying About, 
READ MOTORSPORT, https://readmotorsport.com/2018/07/04/gardening-leave-the-revolving-door-
f1-should-be-worrying-about/ [https://perma.cc/V66V-HVLA] (last visited Mar. 14, 2021). 
 148. Charles A. Sullivan, Tending the Garden: Restricting Competition via “Garden Leave,” 
37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 293, 300–01 (2016) (tracing the origin of the concept and discussing 
its development in English case law). This Note focuses on the English variant of garden leave 
because, as of 2021, six of the ten F1 teams are based in the United Kingdom. See Where Are 
Formula One Teams Based?, SPORTSKEEDA, https://www.sportskeeda.com/f1/where-are-f1-teams-
based [https://perma.cc/7V6X-8XXL] (last visited Mar. 20, 2021). 
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loyalty—and are therefore unable to work for a competitor.149 Since 
these employees still receive wages during the garden leave period, 
these covenants face less judicial scrutiny for unfairness.150 Garden 
leave provisions are often used in lieu of noncompetes because garden 
leaves are more likely to be enforced by courts.151 This type of leave, 
often just three to six months, is generally shorter than noncompete 
restrictions.152 Mercedes, though, imposes garden leave periods of up to 
two years.153 Teams operating on smaller budgets cannot impose such 
lengthy garden leave periods since they are essentially paying someone 
to not work.154  
Teams have complained that Mercedes’s restrictive covenants 
are “aggressive” and unfairly “block the system” of workflow.155 
Renault, for example, working on a budget that is 56 percent of 
Mercedes’s,156 has had to rely heavily on recruiting younger, less 
experienced engineers because of the lengthy restrictions that tie up 
Mercedes’s employees.157 Not only do such restrictions widen the gap 
between the top-tier and midfield teams in a purely work-product sense 
(more experienced engineers generally develop better products), but 
they also give teams like Mercedes a competitive edge in protecting 
their trade secrets. By requiring its employees to remain at Mercedes 
in a non-F1 position (such as road car development) for two years, 
Mercedes ensures that its F1 trade secrets remain within the firm and 
away from rival teams. By the time the garden leave period is up, most 
 
 149. See Sullivan, supra note 148, at 295–96; Peter A. Steinmeyer & Lauri F. Rasnick, 




 150. See Sullivan, supra note 148, at 296 (“[D]eparting employees . . . who would prefer to 
forgo the garden for competitive activity are not likely to be viewed as sympathetically by courts 
as compared to workers whose noncompetition agreements leave them with no income for the  
restricted term. Further, because an employer pays for the leave and therefore has some skin in 
the game, a court might find this arrangement more legitimate and less prone to employer  
overreach than a typical noncompete agreement.”).  
 151. See id. at 322 (“Garden leave provides a clear legal advantage for employers in shifting 
the balance of hardships in preliminary injunction proceedings, the normal setting in which  
noncompetes are enforced.”). 
 152. See Steinmeyer & Rasnick, supra note 149, at 2. 
 153. See Wood, supra note 147 (“Gardening leave is used in F1 to restrict the spread of 
specialist information, often technical, when employees switch between teams.”). 
 154. Id.; Jonathan Noble, Renault: Long Mercedes Gardening Leave Spells Are ‘Unfair,’ 
MOTORSPORT.COM (Oct. 22, 2017, 5:33 AM), https://www.motorsport.com/f1/news/renault-long-
mercedes-gardening-leave-spells-are-unfair-968866/3053560/ [https://perma.cc/TU6B-KCS9]. 
 155. Noble, supra note 154. 
 156. See Fair, supra note 4. 
 157. See Noble, supra note 154. 
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of the confidential race information that the Mercedes employees have 
will be outdated. In contrast, when a Renault engineer leaves to work 
for another team, Renault has only three months to keep that employee 
away from rivals. That means Renault’s IP is still fresh in the 
employee’s memory and much more likely to be competitively relevant 
from a race innovation standpoint.  
Even lengthy garden leave periods fail to outlast the lifespan of 
some constructor IP, though. Unlike the rapid rate of team technical 
innovations, testing methodologies remain much more constant, and 
therefore, immune to garden leave protection.158 Constructors consider 
aerodynamic testing methods to be a valuable form of team IP, given 
the significance of a car’s aerodynamic performance.159 Consequently, 
constructors have a strong interest in keeping this information away 
from rivals. Of course, departing engineers and drivers are still bound 
by their former employer’s nondisclosure agreement (NDA), but 
enforcement of an NDA is not a de facto safeguard to trade secret 
misuse.160 At the outset, NDAs cannot restrict employees from making 
use of all of the information and education they obtained throughout 
the course of employment.161 The “general skill and knowledge” 
acquired while working in a particular industry falls outside the bounds 
of trade secret protection; therefore, the employee can continue to use 
this information in subsequent ventures.162 However, drawing a line 
between protected “know-how” and unprotected “general skill or 
 
 158. Telephone Interview with James Key, supra note 12. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (“Plaintiffs 
in trade secret cases, who must prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence disclosure to third 
parties and use of the trade secret by the third parties, are confronted with an extraordinarily 
difficult task. Misappropriation and misuse can rarely be proved by convincing direct evidence. In 
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that what plaintiffs allege happened did in fact take place. Against this often delicate construct of 
circumstantial evidence there frequently must be balanced defendants and defendants’ witnesses 
who directly deny everything.”). 
 161. See, e.g., Gregory S. Bombard & Adam M. Santeusanio, Distinguishing Employees’ 
“General Skill or Knowledge” from Protectable Trade Secrets Under Massachusetts Law, BOSTON 
BAR J. (Aug. 15, 2018), https://bostonbarjournal.com/2018/08/15/distinguishing-employees-gen-
eral-skill-or-knowledge-from-protectable-trade-secrets-under-massachusetts-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/7GZW-99R5] (“[A]n employer may not claim trade secret protection over an  
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 162. Id.; see also Orly Lobel, NDAs Are Out of Control. Here’s What Needs to Change, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-heres-what-needs-to-
change [https://perma.cc/6JFT-FG4Y] (“[P]laintiffs in trade secrecy litigation frequently try to 
claim . . . general know-how as protected trade secrets. However, judges are rightly skeptical.”). 
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knowledge” is anything but straightforward.163 Because of this, 
employers seeking redress for trade secret misappropriation often face 
an uphill battle.164 Liability can be difficult to establish because it 
requires countering the defendant’s affirmative defense of independent 
development with direct or strong circumstantial evidence that the 
trade secret was used.165  
In recognition of this fact, some jurisdictions have adopted the 
“inevitable disclosure doctrine,” which allows courts to enjoin an 
employee from taking a similar position with a competitor in the 
absence of a noncompetition agreement and without evidence of  
trade secret misappropriation.166 This is because the threat of 
misappropriation is so great given the overlap in job requirements.167 
The underlying rationale is that it is impossible to compartmentalize 
trade secrets when an employee’s new job is so closely related to his or 
her previous job.168 Therefore, even if done unintentionally, reliance on 
and use of that information is a foregone conclusion.169  
Inevitable disclosure claims have had the most success when 
brought against high-level employees who had access to and knowledge 
of the firm’s valuable information.170 It is unlikely that employees in 
 
 163. Bombard & Santeusanio, supra note 161 (“Although the general skill or knowledge 
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either ideas of his own invention or ideas that are in the public domain.”). 
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 166. Jeffrey S. Klein & Gregory Silbert, The Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: The 
Rebirth of a Controversial Doctrine and Where the Courts Stand, 4 BLOOMBERG L.  
REPS. – LAB. & EMP., no. 3, 2010, at 1–2, https://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/inevitable_dis-
closure [https://perma.cc/C8EJ-7ZVM]. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269–70 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 170. See id.; compare Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 105, 119 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (enjoining senior executive from working for former employer’s competitor), with  
Colorcon, Inc. v. Lewis, 792 F. Supp. 2d 786, 803 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F.3d 
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these situations can “unlearn” all of the confidential information that 
they gained throughout their employment.171 In the context of F1, 
overlap in job responsibilities and high exposure to trade secrets are 
both acute concerns. Most of the team employees are highly specialized 
engineers working directly on the design, operation, and development 
of race technology.172 Because working on an F1 car requires an 
exceptional level of expertise, F1 engineers and technicians are highly 
sought after by rival teams, usually because of the knowledge these 
employees acquired from working with competitors.173 And often the 
employees being poached are the exact engineers who developed the 
innovative technology that the constructors are seeking to protect.174 It 
is therefore not illogical to presume that, for example, the engineer who 
designed Ferrari’s front wings would inevitably rely on that knowledge 
when subsequently designing the bodywork for McLaren. 
3. Data Security 
In addition to the race cars and personnel, team computers and 
the telemetry system, which transmits data from the car’s sensors  
to the pit and team headquarters, are vulnerable to trade secret 
misappropriation as well. Mercedes was victim to such a data breach in 
2015 when it discovered that one of its engineers who was leaving for 
Ferrari had accessed confidential race information during his garden 
leave period when he had been assigned to the company’s road car 
sector.175 Outside attempts to hack the telemetry systems of rival 
constructors are also not unheard of.176 Team principals have 
anonymously admitted to such sinister activity.177 Teams go to great 
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 173. See Noble, supra note 154. 
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Designer, AUTOSPORT (June 14, 2018, 5:44 AM), https://www.autosport.com/f1/news/136738/re-
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BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-08/mercedes-sues-f-1-engineer-
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 176. See Hart, supra note 1. 
 177. Id. 
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lengths to secure their data through code encryption, security 
compliance requirements, and device usage policies.178 But as in any 
industry, cybersecurity in F1 is an imperfect science. And F1 teams are 
at higher risk of data breaches than traditional corporations because 
data security technologies must be taken down and reconstructed in a 
different location every week during the season.179 Reconnecting these 
security systems at each Grand Prix track is particularly tricky because 
different countries rely on different internet service providers.180 
B. The Ban on Reverse Engineering Will Not Resolve F1’s Copying 
Problem 
While the FIA’s anti-reverse engineering regulation amendment 
has the potential to reduce some copying, it fails to address the sport’s 
real problem—that is, the prevalence of A-B team relationships. 
Because the FIA approach does not limit the extent to which 
constructors can collaborate in the first place, it exacerbates, rather 
than prevents, the shortcomings of trade secret protection in F1. 
Principally, the FIA solution is a “wait-and-see” tactic, meaning that it 
address illicit reverse engineering after the fact.181 The problem with 
this approach is twofold. First, trade secrets lose their value once they 
have been misappropriated, so ex post recourse often leaves the plaintiff 
less than whole.182 This “once lost, lost forever”183 predicament is 
especially germane to F1, where the difference between placing first or 
fourth can regularly depend on milliseconds, and therefore, even 
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miniscule technological advantages can be of real consequence.184 
Second, as discussed earlier, establishing trade secret misappropriation 
is notoriously difficult,185 and particularly so in environments like F1, 
where employees often leave to work for rivals, taking their “general 
skill and knowledge” with them.186 A plaintiff-constructor’s burden is 
made even heavier by the new FIA regulation because it allows teams 
to be “influenced” by the design and concept of competitors’ listed 
components but does not elaborate on when influence goes too far.187 
This affords defendant-constructors a significant gray area to exploit. 
Moreover, the new FIA restrictions apply only to listed  
parts188—namely, aerodynamic components, since a car’s bodywork is 
most visible to spectators and thus, most at risk of being copied.189 But, 
as evidenced by the Racing Point “Pink Mercedes” saga, aerodynamics 
are only a part of the equation as F1 clone cars would not be possible 
without transferable components and some knowledge of testing 
methodologies.190 These elements, working together, provide a complete 
picture, or “concept,” of the car.191  
Some might argue that the reverse engineering constraints, in 
combination with the Racing Point cautionary tale, will sufficiently 
incentivize independent creation and thwart would-be copiers. This 
belief is misguided. Since the FIA’s announcement of the new 
regulation, F1 has already lost what was one of its last remaining 
independent customer teams, Williams, to the B-team phenomena.192 
As it stands, only two of the ten constructors are not involved in A-B 
team partnerships: McLaren, the sole independent customer team, and 
Renault (racing under the name Alpine in 2021), the sole independent 
works team.193 The increasing prevalence of A-B teams threatens to 
eradicate the independent constructor business model.194 But  
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 189. Brundle, supra note 109 (“[E]minent people in the [F1] paddock assure me that it’s 
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 190. See id.; Rencken & Collantine, supra note 110. 
 191. See Brundle, supra note 109; Rencken & Collantine, supra note 110. 
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 193. See Mitchell, supra note 76; Mitchell, supra note 51. 
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Mitchell, supra note 51; Noble, supra note 66. 
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without independent constructors, F1 races cannot amount to  
genuine competitions. Rather, the races would be comprised of two 
competitions: a first fight for podium position between A-teams and a 
secondary battle between B-teams. This is because the B-team business 
model is not a business model that is designed to win.195 B-teams will 
always be a step behind A-teams because B-teams are not in control of 
their own destiny; they are not privy to the reasoning behind the 
designs of parts they receive from A-teams.196 This puts B-teams at a 
meaningful disadvantage because they have to design the car’s 
aerodynamics around the purchased parts without an understanding of 
the components’ “concept.”197 Therefore, in a competition comprised of 
ten teams, half of the participants are eliminated before the race has 
even begun. 
In F1, no competition is equivalent to no innovation; the 
competition and the IP are one and the same.198 For this reason,  
the FIA must drive independent constructor innovation by limiting 
working-customer team partnerships. 
III. CONSTRUCTOR COLLABORATION HARMS COMPETITION 
Extensive collaboration between A- and B-teams facilitates 
copying, which diminishes innovation and harms competition. 
Therefore, this Note proposes that the FIA take three actions to limit 
the extent of inter-team coordination in F1. First, the FIA should 
recategorize suspension—both front and rear—as listed components, 
rather than transferable ones. Second, the FIA should restrict the 
movement of employees between factory and customer teams by 
requiring a minimum of twelve month’s garden leave. And third, the 
FIA should bolster the rules vis-à-vis the sharing of wind tunnel 
facilities to ensure that testing data does not get passed between teams. 
A. The FIA Should Restrict A-B Team Partnerships 
Unrestricted competition between businesses in an open market 
often leads to greater innovation and product variety.199 In the United 
States and Europe, government agencies regulate the conduct of 
organizations under antitrust laws in order to promote and protect 
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aggressive competition in the free market.200 Unlike some athletic 
organizations in the United States, sports in the European Union are 
not exempt from competition laws.201 Therefore, as the governing body 
of F1, the FIA has a legal responsibility to regulate the racing series in 
a manner consistent with antitrust doctrine. 
At its heart, F1’s A-B team phenomenon is an antitrust issue 
because the practice has allowed three teams with significant market 
power to enhance and entrench their influence by “merging” with five 
of the seven remaining competitors. For this reason, turning to the 
Federal Trade Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines202 will help 
illuminate the harmful effects of this system and highlight why the FIA 
should amend F1 regulations to restrict tie-ups between customer 
teams and their suppliers.203 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines are analytical tools used by 
the Department of Justice to evaluate mergers between competitors.204 
Under the Clayton Act, any merger that might “substantially . . . lessen 
competition, or tend to create a monopoly” violates US federal antitrust 
law and must be blocked or broken up by the government.205 A merger 
might lessen competition if it creates, increases, entrenches, or 
facilitates the use of market power.206 If a merger is likely to encourage 
a competitor to cut back on innovation efforts, or otherwise harms 
consumers as a consequence of decreased competitive pressure or 
incentives, it enhances market power.207 For clarity purposes, this Note 
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will refer to the partnerships between factory teams and their 
respective B-teams as “mergers,” irrespective of team ownership rights. 
1. The Merger’s Effect on Market Concentration 
Mergers in highly concentrated markets are subject to extreme 
scrutiny under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines because of their 
increased potential for significant anticompetitive effects.208 When one 
of the merging parties has significant market share in an already 
concentrated market, the presumption is that the merger will enhance 
market power, and is therefore unlawful.209 This presumption can be 
rebutted by persuasive evidence establishing that the merger is 
unlikely to harm competition in the relevant market.210 
Calculating market concentration requires knowing each 
competitor’s share of the market, which can be done in a multitude of 
ways. Regardless of the approach, it is reasonable to conclude that each 
A-B team merger resulted in a highly concentrated market and 
increased market power. This is because each of the F1 mergers at issue 
involved at least one party with significant market power.211 For 
instance, defining the relevant market as the percentage of team wins 
over the 2014–2020 seasons (138 Grands Prix), Mercedes has roughly 
74 percent of the market; Red Bull has roughly 15 percent; Ferrari has 
roughly 10 percent; and Williams, Renault, and McLaren (the three 
teams that remained independent throughout this period) have a 
combined 0 percent market share.212  
2. The Merger’s Impact on Unilateral Effects 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that if a merger is likely 
to encourage one of the merging parties to reduce its innovative efforts 
to a level below that which would occur without the merger, it is a cause 
for concern.213 Competition spurs innovation, and when a competitor is 
removed from the market (as it is after a merger), it eliminates 
incentives to develop new and different products.214 The Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines further consider whether the merger would tend to 
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cause one of the merging firms to stop offering one of its products.215 
This could also result in anticompetitive effects.216 Such a strategy is 
more likely to transpire when the merging firms offer relatively similar 
products; the merged firm will save money by consolidating the parties’ 
resources and putting them towards developing one single product, 
while simultaneously increasing profit margins by removing a 
competing product from the market.217 
The unilateral effects of A-B team mergers on innovation and 
product variety in F1 are substantial. The transferable component 
dynamic eliminates the need for most teams to invest any resources in 
important aspects of the car, including the critical power unit.218 This 
has certainly resulted in a decrease of product variety, as evidenced by 
the sport’s copying problem. And one need not look further than the 
division of market share to get a pulse on the state of competition. 
During the seven-season data sample, the four B-teams (which raced 
under a slew of different names) possessed just a combined 1.5 percent 
of market share.219 For this reason, the FIA must further restrict  
the catalog of transferable components, specifically by designating 
suspension systems as listed parts. Every constructor should be 
responsible for designing and manufacturing its own front and rear 
suspension because these elements are heavy aerodynamic influencers 
and are therefore performance differentiating.220 Unlike road cars, 
which rely on computer-controlled “active suspension,” the multi-linked 
suspension system of F1 cars gives engineers far more control over 
wheel angles, which effect the lift, dive, and squat of the car.221 Recall 
that aerodynamics are the touchstone of listed components.222 If works 
teams were also able to supply customers with bodywork data, the cars 
would be almost indistinguishable from each other.223 While some 
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racing fans may invite the prospect of purely driver-determined Grands 
Prix, such an approach is at odds with the innovative spirit of F1.224  
The discrepancies in constructor technology are what define the 
competition, which is why the FIA should amend the regulations to 
make suspension a listed part.225 Performance differentiators must 
remain within each team’s control because independent innovation is 
critical to the sport’s success.226 
3. The Merger’s Impact on Coordinated Effects 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines also advise against mergers 
that would enable or encourage coordinated conduct between 
competitors.227 Coordinated interaction is considered problematic if it 
profits the coordinating firms at the expense of the excluded market 
participants.228 If the merger would significantly increase market 
concentration, or if there is evidence that the relevant market is already 
vulnerable to coordinated conduct, there is a presumption that the 
merger will result in anticompetitive effects.229 If a firm with 
substantial market power has previously colluded with competitors, 
this is evidence that the market is vulnerable to coordinated conduct, 
and as a consequence, the merger should be blocked.230 Furthermore, a 
market that allows firms to easily detect each other’s competitive 
initiatives is particularly susceptible to collusive behavior.231 This  
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kind of environment is more feasible when the market is highly 
concentrated.232 
There is no question that A-B teams have increased the amount 
of coordinated conduct in F1—that is the primary function of these 
technical partnerships. But there is also ample evidence to support  
the conclusion that this increased cooperation has been a detriment  
to fellow constructors. Williams’s recent decision to relinquish its 
independence highlights the increased pressure that team mergers 
impose on independent constructors.233 The prevalence of A-B teams 
has called the future of independent constructors into question.234 
Independent constructors compete head-to-head with B-teams, who 
operate on significantly smaller budgets but can generate equal levels 
of performance.235 Independent constructors also compete head-to-head 
with A-teams, but in recent history, have had access to only a fraction 
of their resources.236 Furthermore, the sharing of testing facilities and 
personnel could facilitate the ease by which illicit, nontransferable 
information can be passed between A- and B-teams.237 This puts teams 
like McLaren and Renault, who decline to share IP, at an even greater 
disadvantage.  
Consequently, it is necessary to restrict the degree of 
collaboration between teams that share wind tunnels and personnel. 
Although the technical regulations mandate that “robust processes” be 
in place to prevent the transfer of aerodynamic IP, and further state 
that the movement of employees cannot be used to skirt this 
requirement, the FIA does not specify what these processes should 
entail.238 Therefore, the regulations should be amended to (1) impose  
a minimum of twelve month’s garden leave on departing employees,  
(2) restrict which A-team employees can be present during a customer 
team’s wind tunnel testing, (3) require that customer wind tunnel 
testing data is kept on a separate server, and (4) ensure that all data is 
taken off-site when the customer leaves. These preventive measures are 
necessary in an environment like F1, where the ability to protect  
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IP is limited, and the opportunities for employee fraternization are 
frequent.239 
4. The Merger’s Impact on Entry into the Market 
A crucial consideration of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is 
whether a merger may lessen the likelihood of prospective competitors 
entering the market.240 This is an important part of the assessment 
because the easy introduction of additional rivals minimizes the 
anticompetitive effects of horizontal mergers.241 In order to overcome 
the presumption against sanctioning mergers that result in an increase 
of market power, the entry must be likely, timely, and sufficient.242 A 
competitor’s entry is likely if it would be profitable; it is timely if it can 
happen quickly enough to make the merging firm’s anticompetitive 
actions unprofitable. Finally, an entry is sufficient if, in addition to 
being likely and timely, it would adequately counteract the merger’s 
harmful effects on competition in the relevant market.243 
A-teams create substantial barriers to entry in the F1  
engine-supply market by tethering smaller constructors to them 
through shared components, personnel, and test facilities. 
Manufacturing F1 power units costs hundreds of millions of dollars, and 
there is no guaranteed return on investment.244 It is therefore unlikely 
that any firm would undertake such an endeavor without the 
expectation of wooing several F1 customer-teams. As long as Mercedes 
and Ferrari continue to control over 50 percent of the constructor 
market, the timely entry of a third-party engine manufacturer seems 
very improbable.245 Even current F1 customer teams—which should 
presumably be keen to take on engine manufacturing given the 
competitive and financial advantages—are unlikely to expand 
production efforts.246 B-teams are B-teams because they lack the 
resources and capabilities required to independently manufacture 
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transferable components;247 given the option, every constructor would 
certainly prefer to manufacture its own IP because doing so 
dramatically increases on-track success.248 McLaren, the last 
constructor left standing in the void between factory-team and B-team, 
has also stated that it does not intend to enter the engine market for 
financial reasons.249 Therefore, as it stands, F1 will continue to be 
powered by just four engine manufacturers.250 The absence of likely and 
timely entry into the F1 engine market is unfortunate, not merely 
because it increases homogeneity in a sport that is lacking healthy 
competition, but also because, five years from now, regulation changes 
will mandate that F1 cars run on the most energy-efficient engines in 
the championship’s history.251 As a result, global consumers have a  
real interest in seeing more manufacturers enter the F1 engine market, 
as increased competition means more investment and variety in  
green innovation. This benefits the public because it augments the 
possibilities of incorporating F1 technologies into road cars and service 
industries.  
B. Counterarguments 
The chief counterargument to be levied against A-B team 
restrictions is that, without an extensive level of collaboration, smaller 
F1 teams would cease to exist. Eliminating constructors would certainly 
negatively affect the competition, but the concern is an unnecessary 
one. The FIA, aware of the increasing gap between top-tier teams and 
the midfield, has already taken precautions to ensure the longevity  
of customer teams.252 Many of these measures—including the 
introduction of a spending cap253 and a “sliding scale” approach to 
aerodynamic testing254—have the potential to level the playing field 
over the coming years. Nevertheless, even without incoming regulation 
changes, the solution presented by this Note does not impose 
insurmountable financial burdens on B-teams. First, limiting the 
movement of employees between factory and customer teams will lower, 
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rather than raise, B-team expenses. This is because A-teams began this 
practice as a means of circumventing upcoming budget limitations.255 
This self-serving practice has even caused some F1 commentators to 
jokingly describe it as a “slave team” dynamic.256 
Next, requiring customer teams to independently develop 
suspension components is unlikely to impose expenses that are overly 
burdensome. Most of the production cost would be offset by the funds 
not paid to factory-teams in exchange for that same part, which has its 
own competitive advantages because it limits the financial resources of 
A-teams.257 Furthermore, the customer team’s potential for increased 
on-track success offers an additional competitive benefit.258 Lap-time 
proficiencies can be found by exercising greater control over all aspects 
of a car’s aerodynamic effect.259 
The solution’s third element simply requests that the FIA 
specify which protocols should be in place to ensure that the current 
regulations—which forbid the transfer of aerodynamic IP—are 
followed. Therefore, this measure should not impose any burden on 
constructors greater than what it already required of them. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The 2020 season brought to light both the magnitude and scope 
of car-copying capabilities in F1, thanks to Racing Point’s “Pink 
Mercedes.” In an attempt to prevent future clone cars, the FIA  
has added an “anti-reverse engineering” amendment to the 2021 
regulations.260 This regulation change fails to tackle the root of the 
copycat problem, though. The primary reason that copying is so 
prevalent in F1 is because of FIA regulations that allow constructors to 
license “transferable” components of their cars to competitors.261 These 
technical alliances, or A-B team relationships, result in extensive 
collaboration between rivals and often include sharing personnel and 
aerodynamic testing facilities. A-B team partnerships are problematic 
for a number of reasons. First, they harm competition by widening the 
gap between factory-teams and B-teams.262 Factory teams have the 
upper hand because they are designing the IP. Second, the degree of 
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collaboration between A-B teams facilitates the illicit sharing of 
nontransferable, “listed” components.263 This enables the ease and 
accuracy of copying listed components, which in turn disincentivizes 
investment in independent invention. Because the FIA regulation 
change does not restrict the degree of inter-team collaboration in F1, it 
will likely fall short of resolving the sport’s copying problem.264 A better 
approach is found by analyzing the issue through an antitrust doctrine 
lens.265 Factory-teams are entrenching their significant market power 
by strengthening ties with smaller, less influential constructors.266 
Breaking up these “merged” firms will reintroduce competitive forces 
into F1 and revitalize its innovative spirit.  
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